ss Mohamed Ali El-Kebir The Sinking From: Admiralty War Diary At dusk on the 7 August the ship was torpedoed by U-38 in a position 55^0N, 15^0W about 250 miles west of Malin Head, and sank. Gladiolus and Mallow who were in the neighbourhood were ordered to assist and four destroyers which had escorted convoy WS 2 to a position about 150 miles further west were also dispatched. Griffin saved about 600 men, including 35 wounded and others may also have been saved. Examination of aerial photographs detected a U-boat at L’Orient.
From Admiralty, The War at Sea Volume 1 9/39 - 12/40 Para 142 p174. Military Transport Sunk
One of the very rare cases of the loss of a military transport occurred on Aug. 7th 1940, when the Mohamed Ali el-Kebir, 7527 tons, carrying 732 naval and military details, supplies and equipment, from Avonmouth to Gibraltar, was torpedoed and sunk at 19.56 in 55^022'N, 13^018'W by a U-boat. The destroyer Griffin, sole escort saved about 740 including 2 naval officers and 59 ratings, 20 army officers and 505 other ranks, leaving 120 presumed lost.
Other Reports The following accounts of the incident have been obtained from the Public Record Office (PRO) and various other published and unpublished sources.
From PRO ADM/101 564 Medical Officer’s Journal HMS Griffin
August 7th 1940 Late in the evening this ship was called on to rescue the survivors of the troopship Mahomet el Ali Kebir (sic). For various reasons rescue work proceeded throughout the night. A variety of injuries were encountered - the majority being fractures of the leg and arm - splints were entirely inadequate for such a large number and a large amount had to be contrived. Open fractures were reduced under local anaesthesia (2% novatex) roughly splinted and debridement followed by instillation of powdered sulphonamide. Debridement was assisted by staining the wound with an alcoholic solution of 1/1000 Gentian Violet - all stained and dead tissue being removed. Only one death occurred - a naval rating, name unknown (body transferred to Naval Authorities, Greenock) from multiple fractures of tibia, femur, pelvis and humerus. It was reported in the Times that many deaths occurred on board from exposure. In view of the facts, this was felt to be a gross error and was much resented by my willing helpers in the ship’s company and myself. In all, 766 survivors were landed at Greenock comprising 704 uninjured or mildly injured, and 62 discharged to Hospital (59 to the Military Hospital and 3 to Naval Hospital). I should like to mention the superb assistance given by members of the ship’s company during a trying 36 hours, special reference being made to RNASBR Dix and Chief Stoker Kent RN. MO G J Walley Surgeon Lt. RN
From PRO ADM 199 2133. Merchant Vessel Survivors Reports British Merchant Vessels Attacked, Damaged or Lost by Enemy Action from 1 June to 31 August 1940, by Shipping Casualties Section, Trade Division, Admiralty. p 200. Report of an interview with Mr L C Hill, Chief Officer of the ss Mohamed Ali el-Kebir Shipping Casualties Section, Trade Division 12 August 1940.
Casualties Section, Trade Division 12 August 1940 Mr Hill: ‘We were bound from Avonmouth to Gibraltar with a cargo of military stores. The colour of our hull was black, superstructure buff and funnel buff. Wireless was fitted and we were armed with a 4" HE gun and 6 Lewis guns belonging to the military. We were flying a Red Ensign at the time of the attack. The crew including the Captain numbered 164 of whom 2 are slightly injured, 4 Europeans (Captain, Chief W/T Operator, Doctor and a quartermaster) and 6 natives are missing. We also had on board 26 officers and 706 other ranks. I believe some 40 or 50 of these are missing, and I know that 36 are injured and in hospital. The confidential books were all thrown overboard in the weighted bag. The ship had just been degaussed at Liverpool and the apparatus was switched on. We left Avonmouth at 20.00 BST on 5 August bound for Gibraltar, sailing independently with one destroyer as escort. We continued without incident at a speed of 15 knots, zig-zagging on No. 15 (a predetermined sequence of course changes), until the 7 August. On this day there was a big swell, but not much sea, a moderate breeze, good visibility but overcast. The destroyer kept ahead of us most of the time, but also on a zig-zag course. At 20.45 BST on 7 August when in position 55^0 North 15^0 West about 250 miles from land, there was an explosion aft. I was amidships on the promenade deck, I felt the ship vibrate, as if a gun had been fired. I could not see aft from where I was, but as far as I know there was no flash or smoke, but a column of water was thrown up which I saw descending on the port side. There was no smell. The ship immediately settled aft, but did not list. When the explosion occurred, the destroyer was on our port quarter. A few hours earlier she had been listening, but I do not think she was doing so then, as there was no sign of the U-boat, nor of the wake of the torpedo. I immediately went to the bridge to report to the Captain, then I saw that the watertight doors were properly closed (they were operated electrically from the bridge) and went aft to see what damage had been done. I think we were hit slightly on the starboard quarter, very near the stern, at the after end of the gun platform. The gun had fallen forward, against the davits of a boat, jamming the falls. At the point of the explosion was a house, then the poopdeck with the dynamo house, the gun and 4 boats. The magazine was between the dynamo house and the hospital on the after side of the gun with the steel house intervening. We had two bulkheads in the engine room, the after peak bulkhead which presumably went right away, and another bulkhead between nos. 4 and 5 holds. The 2nd. Officer who was aft heard the second bulkhead go. The deck at the after end was sloping into the water, there was no fire, and amidships everything was intact. I went back to the bridge and reported the damage to the captain. He had already given orders to man the boats; I superintended the lowering of them and launching of rafts. The outboard boats were perfectly alright, as they were ready for lowering, but the inner boats (we had two rows) were more difficult. One of these inner boats was smashed by the explosion, another had the davits buckled, all the after boats were put out of action. None of the boats capsized. The ship was badly down by the stern but upright during the launching of the boats, and all serviceable lifeboats and rafts were got away before she went down. Everyone had a Board of Trade lifebelt. The last I personally saw of the Captain we were both on the bridge together, he gave the order to jump, so I went onto the deck and thought he followed me. I jumped into the water and was picked up by the destroyer about half an hour later. The destroyer immediately after she saw the explosion, dropped depth charges one side, swept straight across our quarter and dropped more charges on the other side. After about 1hr 50 minutes, the ship which had been going down by the stern all the time, rose absolutely vertical, with the bow out of the water, then plunged straight down. After that the destroyer dropped no more depth charges, but began picking up the various boats and rafts. She lowered two whalers in the position where the ship sank, then returned and took the whalers back on board, after steaming round in all directions. She brought us back to Greenock where we arrived at 5 am on Friday 9th August. A number of men had their legs broken by the explosion. Everybody of every rank was exceedingly helpful. We owe a deep debt of gratitude to the naval ratings on board, they were magnificent. Some of the military personnel spoke very highly of Quartermaster Anderson, particularly the way he kept up morale of the boat’s crew and got them away from the ship.’
From PRO ADM Series Report of Captain of HMS Griffin
Subject		Report of Proceedings
From		The Commanding Officer, HMS Griffin
Date		19th August 1940				No 002/MB/29.
To		The Commander in Chief, Western Approaches; Through Captain (D), Thirteenth Destroyer Flotilla.
Submitted. The following report of proceedings for the period August 5th to August 17th is forwarded. HMS Griffin sailed from Devonport at 1700/5th August and met ss Mohomed Ali El Kebir (sic) near Helvick L/V at 05.00 on August 6th. At 21.45/7th August, when in position 55^0 25'N, 13^0 18'W, an explosion near the stern, the starboard side of Mohamed Ali was observed. At this time both ships were carrying out Zig Zag No15 at 15 knots on the mean course of 258 degrees. The course at the time was 288 degrees and the position of ss Mohamed Ali relative to Griffin was green 140, about one mile. Mohamed Ali settled slightly by the stern and boats and rafts were manned and lowered. Griffin proceeded towards the starboard beam and a contact was obtained. A deliberate attack was carried out on the contact and a pattern of five Depth Charges set to 250 feet was dropped at 22.00. The contact was not very clear cut and there was no HE, but moderate evidence of movement. No result was evident after the attack and no further contact could be obtained in the vicinity. I, then, decided to carry out a sweep to the Northward and did this for a distance of about five miles, during this sweep no contact was obtained, and I returned to the vessel. By this time there were about 11 very heavily laden boats in the water, and about 20 to 25 rafts. The wind was WNW force 5 and there was a moderate swell, with a certain amount of ‘White horses’. I went alongside one boat at 21.45, and remained stopped for about ten minutes; during this time two boats were cleared of survivors. After this I steamed round in a circle and dropped one Depth Charge at a time at intervals of about five minutes, with a view to keeping the submarine deep, if she should happen to be in the vicinity. At about 22.15 I closed in again and recovered more survivors; whilst doing this I received a signal from Mohamed Ali , asking me to go alongside, as the ship was not expected to last much longer. I cast off the boats alongside and proceeded to close her. At this moment a periscope was reported by a lookout, but I was unable to obtain any contact and went on to endeavour to get alongside the ship. Unfortunately the Mohamed Ali sank very suddenly when I was about 3 cables off. I lowered both my whalers to pick up those who had jumped when the ship sank. After dropping the whalers I steamed around again and fired three separate charges as before. I then went back to recover more survivors, and subsequently closed my whalers again. These had succeeded in recovering about 30 men. I sent one boat away again with a volunteer crew to see if they could find more men in the water. This boat was later recovered with 8 men on board. I spent the rest of the night steaming around and going alongside the remaining boats and rafts, and by 03.30 was unable to find any more.This time I carried out an A/S sweep to the westward for half an hour and returned to the area at 04.30. I searched until 07.30 by which time I had found one fully laden boat and one raft with four men on it. I felt reasonably certain now that there were no more living survivors, and accordingly I set course for the UK. Watchman and Vortigern were sighted at 07.00. Altogether about 770 survivors were recovered, of whom 40 were suffering from various injuries, mostly broken legs. Surgeon Lieutenant J G Whalley (sic) RNVR worked unceasingly on the casualties throughout the rescue operations, and all the time until the ship arrived in Greenock. The bearing of all Officers and men on board during the rescue operations was of the very highest order. The following ratings are specially recommended for recognition of their outstanding services – Leading Seaman J Hartnett, D/J. 115146. Able Seaman J McMahon, D/Jx. 153951. Able Seaman T Clare, D/SSx 23404. The above named ratings who had already been away about an hour in one of the whalers, volunteered and went away again for the second trip. Assistant C Punsheon, D/Mx 62058. This rating went away as a volunteer in the whaler. Leading Seaman A Gibbons, D/Jx 128473. Leading Seaman J Law, D/Jx 132215. These two ratings throughout the night did invaluable work in going down into the rafts getting the wounded men on board. Griffin arrived at Greenock at 04.30 on August 9th and disembarked survivors. The ship sailed in company with HMS Revenge at 09.30 on August 11th. Griffin parted from Revenge at 08.30 on August 13th and proceeded to Gibraltar arriving at 08.30 on August 17th. J. Lee Barber Lieutenant Commander In Command
From: PRO ADM Series Report of Officer in Command Naval Draft
‘Greenacres’ Adlington Nr Macclesfield Cheshire The Director of Sea Transport Ministry of Shipping Berkeley Square London 11 August 1940 Sir I have the honour to submit the following report concerning the sinking by Enemy Action of the ‘Mohamed-Ali-El-Kebir’ :- The Naval Draft on board consisted of two Officers, 44 Ratings and 20 Marines. The ship had 10 Outboard Lifeboats and 10 Inboard Lifeboats, and so I had arranged the Naval Lifeboat stations as follows - Two Ratings in each Outside Lifeboat for letting go gripes and unhooking falls - Two Ratings for each boat on deck for lowering - 10 marines with 50 rounds of Ammunition per man to be Sentries abreast each boat to act under orders of the Officer Cox’un to prevent panic if necessary. The remainder of the Naval draft were organised into three raft parties working under my own orders and the Chief Officer of the ship. The ship was struck right aft at 20.42 on Wednesday 7th August 1940. The signal to stand by lifeboats was immediately sounded on the siren. There was no panic and the Soldiers mustered abreast their various boat stations. Very shortly afterwards the Captain gave the order ‘Man and lower all boats’. During the next two hours that followed before the ship sank at 22.40, the process of getting all boats and rafts away and the lowering of wounded men from the After Troop Deck was carried out systematically. I inspected the damage aft and came to the conclusion that it was undoubtedly a Torpedo that had hit us - the after outboard lifeboat on the starboard side was completely destroyed in the explosion, and the 4" gun had been blown from its support to what remained of the deck. The whole of the stern from about four yards from right aft was sagging down at an acute angle. Towards the end there was only one lifeboat left which was jammed inboard on the starboard side. The Captain, Chief Officer, the O/C Troops and myself, and also about 30 soldiers were still on board. The ship turned on end very quickly and the remaining personnel jumped for it and some managed to get rafts and spars, being picked up later by the Destroyer’s Whaler. As I have already reported there were two Able Seamen and four Stokers missing from the Naval Draft, and it is known that all these men were right aft in the After Troop Deck at the time of the explosion. One Stoker died on the passage home and three other Naval Ratings were taken to hospital. Sub-Lieutenant J W White, RNVR called for volunteers to go down the After Troop Deck with himself, and succeeded in bringing up on deck three or four wounded soldiers. Sub-Lieutenant White was put in charge by me of the After Lifeboat Stations in my previous organisation. Petty Officer C Peacock, Off/No. J.20360 - P15845 showed great efficiency and zeal when in charge of one of the Naval Raft parties. This Petty Officer was a pensioner after twenty five years service, and is strongly recommended for advancement to Chief Petty Officer. I am, Sir Your Obedient Servant Anthony H. Parish Lieutenant RN. Officer in Command. Naval Draft
From Personal Memoir of Commander Alec Dennis Navigating Officer of HMS Griffin (pp72 - 75) Deposited with the Imperial War Museum. (Commander Dennis died on June 29, 2008, aged 90. His obituary can be read in the Times Online è)
Mohamed Ali el-Kebir This time it was back to Plymouth, but not for long. One night in and we were off up the Irish Sea, bound for the Mediterranean. This was quite a surprise and, it must be admitted, a relief that we were to be away from the English Channel. On the other hand we had been so much geared up to meet the invasion that it would be sad to miss it; at least we would have had something to shoot at instead of just being a target all the time. But - what will be, will be. And at least the water would be warm. Off the Clyde we picked up a troopship, the Mohamed Ali el-Kebir (the ‘great’), stuffed full of troops. We were the only escort that could be spared, so we took station ahead, zig-zagging as usual across the line of advance and ‘pinging’ away. All went well until a little before dark when there was an explosion - not a big one - right aft in the Mohamed, and she started to sink slowly by the stern. Although not absolutely certain, we felt she had probably been hit by a torpedo. The water was rather deep for a mine, and sabotage seemed unlikely. So, after circling the wreck searching for a U-boat, we closed her as she sank and started to pick up survivors, of whom there were many. I’m sure most destroyer people have experienced that very naked feeling when you are stopped in the dark, a sitting target for a U-boat which by now will have reloaded his torpedoes. And quite a number of ships have been lost in this way. I well remember feeling acutely uncomfortable; the Asdic regularly giving its reverberating ping, and no firm echoes returning; all on the bridge glued to binoculars, and Tony Juniper on the iron deck trying to embark hundreds of wet soldiers without showing a light. Luckily most of them had got away in the boats, so we moved from boat to boat, occasionally doing a circuit to scare off our U-boat. At this, of course, the remaining boats thought they were being abandoned and yelled and flashed lights, which didn’t help the feeling of nakedness. Inevitably, we were pulling one lot aboard when a lookout reported a periscope on the beam. So, quickly full ahead, leaving a lot of unhappy survivors behind. It was probably a false alarm, and we returned later. It was a miserable night but by dawn we had got nearly all of them - 873 in all; I think, a record for our ship. They turned out to be reinforcements for the garrison of Gibraltar, and included a group of Canadian hard rock miners who were to bore tunnels in the rock. They were urgently needed and only had a day’s turn round in the Clyde before going out again. (There is an interesting comment in the diary of John Colville (Churchill’s private secretary) –‘The Fringes of Power’: "The First Lord told me on the telephone about 1am that a troopship had been torpedoed off Ireland. This depressed Winston greatly; however he recovered when he heard that nearly all the men had been saved, and that there were no valuable stores on board, merely remarking that the navy was not being as successful against U-boats as in the past. We have lost much shipping lately." ) By now the weather had turned thick, with visibility of no more than a mile. As navigator I was somewhat concerned about our position as we had wandered about quite a lot and the currents were uncertain. As we set course for the Clyde, going Easterly, we sounded regularly, but had to go faster than was navigationally prudent. When at last some grey land loomed up ahead there was doubt whether it was Scotland or Ireland. If Scotland, we should turn quickly to starboard; if Ireland, even more quickly to port. At this moment Jon Walley, the doctor, a yachtsman of some experience, arrived on the bridge. ‘Ah, Islay!’ he intoned, ‘Of course, Doc’, we said deviously. He was right, and we turned right and all was well.
(Attached to the memoir is a photograph of the Mohamed taken by Lt. Walley just after she was hit). Mohamed was torpedoed by U–38. Copies of the log of U–38 for August 1940 have been obtained from various sources, and thanks to a number of valiant efforts the following composite translation is available. Extract from War Diary of U–boat ‘U–38’ Commandant: Captain Lieutenant Liebe 6th Operation – Started 1.8.40 Finished 3.9.40
7.8.40
00.00	56^o 12’N 13^o 44’W		Overcast
01.13				Received radio message 20.55 from U–56 re convoy sailing westwards. Because no further message followed, did not approach, because distance 200 nautical miles, but continued to patrol on same latitude.
04.00	55^o 56’N 13^o 44’W		Overcast	Entered operational area.
04.50				To port, vessel blacked out. Attack. On approach, identified as fishing trawler, as guard. Broke off attack, withdrew. Around 05.40 to starboard probable submarine sighted, then immediately lost. Withdrew somewhat eastwards. Continued patrol.
08.00	56^o 00’N 13^o 46’W		Overcast, visibility good	No incidents.
12.00	55^o 46’N 13^o 28’W		Overcast, rain, visibility poor	Aircraft alerts at 13.00, 13.41 and 15.18.
16.00	55^o 32’N 13^o 46’W		Overcast, rain	Surfaced.
17.18				Aircraft alert.
18.25				Surfaced, then immediately new alert, large unescorted (8000t) freighter steaming westward, distance 8000m. Steamer not sighted or heard previously owing to heavy sea. Angle unsuitable and distance too great to attack. Attempt to follow unsuccessful owing to heavy sea (speed down to 12nm) and freighter passing out of sight.
19.03				Surfaced.
19.48				Aircraft alert.
20.00	55^o 18’N
21.00				Surfaced. After surfacing, again surprised by 1 passenger steamer (10,000t)* escorted by two destroyers forward to port, distance 8–9000m. Owing to swell and heavy sea, full view not possible before surfacing, an unpleasant situation, which has twice already led to surprise situations. *This was the Mohamed.
21.46				Torpedo spread within escort. Distance 1000m. Two clicks, then detonation. 1 torpedo definite hit. According to acoustic surveillance, steamer immediately stopped. Further observation not possible owing to immediate pursuit, depth–charges, s–equipment. Heavy damage definitely to be assumed. More exact details on steamer could not be established. In course of pursuit, 3 more depth–charges further away. At one point s–equipment precisely overhead. Impression of steel wire dragging over boat, heavy knocking and noise, as if glass being crunched. However, no depth–charges dropped at this point.
8.8.40
01.35			Cloudy	Surfaced, sight free. Went South. No occurrences.
08.00				Submerged because weather unsuitable for attacking due to strong sea and low clouds.
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